THE PROPOSAL TO TAX INCOME FROM
GOVERNMENTAL SECURITIES
I. THE CASE FOR TAXATION
WILLIAM J. SHUL'*

When the federal income tax was enacted in 1913, it was assumed, without par-

ticular inquiry or discussion, that taxing the interest on state and local bonds would
constitute taxation of a state instrumentality, forbidden under the rule of CollectorV.
Day.' A few years later, to establish a better market for the Liberty Loans, they
were made partially or wholly exempt from federal income taxation; the tradition
of partial exemption was maintained in later federal debt issues. With the expansion
of state borrowing during the 192o's, and of federal borrowing during the 193o's,
there were outstanding in 1939 thi .tyfivebillion dollars of governmental issues
whose interest was wholly exempt from federal income taxation and thirty-three billion dollars whose interest was exempt froni the federal income surtax.
Individual fiscal writers discussed the economic aspects of the problem during the
192o's and early i93o's, but legislative interest in the issue was nil. In 1938 the

Treasury Department opened the subject to popular and legislative controversy by its
claim that there were no constitutional bars to immediate taxation of the interest on
state and local securities, and its recommendation that the interest on future state and
local issues be taxed under federal law. Coupled with this recommendation were the
proposals that the federal government discontinue issuing tax-exempt securities on
its own account, and that future federal issues be made subject to, nondiscriminatory
state taxation.

Hearings on these proposals were held by a special Senate committee during January and February 1939.2 These hearings provide a complete source for statistics on
the subject and for the arguments on both sides of the Issue. The present article
summarizes the economic and fiscal arguments and evidence presented by the author
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and others at these hearings in support of the propositions that the practice of issuing
tax-exempt federal securities should be discontinued and that the interest on future
state and local issues should be subjected to federal taxation, provided that a
reciprocal tax right be extended by judicial construction or by specific legislative
enactment to the state governments. The constitutional aspects of the issue are
treated in a later articles
Io

The basic argument of those who recommend the ending of tax exemption of the
interest on government securities is that every tax-exempt bond issued involves a
revenue loss to the taxing governments that outweighs any saving of interest to the
issuing government. It should be a self-evident proposition that in general no bond
buyer will pay more, through lower yield, for tax exemption than such exemption is
worth to him.4 If he can purchase tax exemption for less than it is worth to him, in
terms of yield differential, of course he will do so. As will be shown, most if not all
bond buyers do purchase tax exemption for much less than it is worth to them.
Whatever such bond buyers gain is a net loss to the taxing governments not offset
by any interest rate saving to the issuing governments.
The market for tax exemption is definitely limited-much more limited than the
market for government bonds which, while providing tax exemption, also yield such
financial values as security, approved place on legal lists, and eligibility for sinking
funds. We cannot assume that all the earning capital of individual and business
income tax payers is potentially convertible into government securities for the purpose
of translating taxable income into tax-exempt income, and that the market for tax
exemption is coextensive with individual and business earning capital. Most of this
individual and business capital represents "operating" or "control" investment, and
no tax saving could tempt the owners to substitute government bonds in place of it.
Only "nonoperating" individual and business investment funds are potentially in
the market for tax exemption. My guess, based upon statistics for individual, business, and institutional holdings of governmental issues, is that the present market
for tax exemption in the United States is not much greater than, and possibly less
than, the sixty-eight billion dollars of governmental securities now outstanding.
Because of the progressiv e character of the federal personal income tax rate
schedule, the principle of diminishing utility applies to this demand for tax exemption. To the fortunate individual with $5,oooooo or more of taxable income, tax
exemption for his "nonoperating" capital is worth, in interest rate differential, four
fifths of the current market interest rate. To the business corporation it is worth
one sixth of the current interest rate. To the man with $4,000 of taxable income, it
' Rouzer, Legal Problems in Taxing Income from Governmental Securities, infra p. 235.

'One exception may be noted to this generalization-if bond buyers willing to pay full value for tax
exemption were to evaluate that exemption on the basis of continuing high tax rates or higher future rates,
and if such eventuality did not materialize, then the long-run saving in interest to the issuing governments
would be greater than the long-run revenue loss to the taxing governments. As will be evident from the
argument that follows, this exception, should it occur, would operate to mitigate, not prevent, revenue loss.
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is worth one twenty-fifth of the current interest rate. The outstanding supply of
governmental securities carrying tax exemption will determine how far down the
curve of diminishing utility the marginal value of tax exemption will be found.
My contention is that, given the present demand curve for tax exemption as determined by the volume of "nonoperating" individual and business capital, and as
affected by the income tax rate schedule and the present supply of governmental debt
issues, the marginal value-and hence the interest rate differential-of tax exemption
is close to nil. The volume of tax-exempt securities issued during the past twenty
years has made tax exemption almost a "free good" and has killed its value to issuing
governments. Were tax exemption abolished today, federal, state and local units
could issue taxable bonds tomorrow at practically the same interest rates as they did
tax-exempts yesterday.5

By this I do not mean to imply that governmental issues now enjoy no interest
differential over corporate issues. Besides providing tax exemption, governmental
issues also yield such financial- values as security and approved position on legal lists
and for sinking funds. The market for these financial values, which embraces purchases by savings banks, charitable foundations and other agencies to whom tax
exemption is valueless, as well as purchases by all individuals willing to pay foi
security of capital by accepting lower yield, is wider than the market for tax exemption. While demand for these financial values is also subject to the law of diminishing utility, the variation in its marginal utility is much milder than that for tax.
exemption. I suspect that, with the supply of governmental securities on the market
today, the marginal utility of the financial values of these securities may well be
higher than the marginal value of tax exemption inherent in these securities. If this
should be so, then any interest rate differential on governmental issues is determined
by their financial values and not by tax exemption. If the marginal utility of tax
exemption is still somewhat greater than that of the financial values of governmental
securities, then the net market worth of tax exemption is only the spread between
the two values. The yield differential of governmental- bonds assumed by most observers to be a measure of the value of tax exemption is in reality wholly or in major
part a measure of their special financial value
How can the conclusions presented above be reconciled with the statement generally made by defenders of tax exemption that such exemption saves security-issuing
governments .6% interest on every bond they issue? No reconciliation is possible.
sIf tax exemption were to be denied to all future issues of governmental securities, while outstanding
issues continued to enjoy the privilege, the gradual reduction of the supply of tax-exempt securities would
slowly raise the mrginal value of exemption. After a period of years, this marginal value would be
quite high, and the remaining supply of tax-exempts would enjoy a substantial yield differential. This
consideration does not constitute an argument for continuing exemption, for it would be the abolition of
exemption for future governmental issues that would give value to the exemptioa of the remaining older
Issues.
SThe argument developed above is considerably more extreme than the one I presented a year ago to
the Special Committee. Then I accepted the Treasury's position that there existed a: .4% "tax exemption"
interest differential. Now I am persuaded that the Treasury economists erred in interpreting a "financial
value" interest differential as a "tax exemption" interest differential.
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This .6% figure is derived from a report made by Professor Harley L. Lutz of
Princeton University to the Special Committee last year. His argument for this
figure was that it constituted an average of the judgment of "expert market opinion,"
and that it was supported by observation of the yield difference between a group of
selected government bonds and another group of corporate issues. The Treasury
economists showed that the range of judgments of the "expert market opinion" was
from .3% to over Io/, so that a .6%. "average" was statistically meaningless, and they
attacked Professor Lutz's choice of bond lists used for comparison. The interest
differential they offered was -40. But they also erred, in my opinion, in attributing
this differeritial to tax exemption rather than to the 'special financial values of
governmental securities.
2.

Defenders of tax exemption argue that while the federal government loses revenue
because of the exemption of state and local issues, the state and local governments
gain by the interest differential, though somewhat less than the federal government
loses.7 The mayors and fiscal officials of hundreds of cities protested to the Special
Committee last year that elimination of the tax exemption of local securities would
impose a crushing additional cost burden upon their governments, which would be
passed along only to the already overtaxed property owners. Of course, this argument is vitiated by the finding that the "tax exemption" interest differential, and
hence the profit of tax exemption to issuing governments, is negligible. Cities,
towns, villages, counties and state governments would have to pay nothing, or little
more, in debt service if the exemption of intcrest on their securities from federal
taxation were abolished.
But assuming that there were some gain in tax exemption to these governments,
would this justify a continuation of tax exemption? I say no. The state and local
governments are simply setting up a claim of vested interest in a fiscal defect that
they believe, mistakenly, operates to their advantage. Were there any gain to these
governments through tax exemption, the solution would be, not a continuance of
tax exemption, but a substitution of grants-in-aid or distributed revenues to compensate for the extra debt service cost.
' Last year Professor Lutz carried his argument to an extreme length, and argued that the annual
interest differential gain on tax exemption was $79,000,000 greater than the tax loss. Taxation of Govern.

mental Securities and Salaries, supra note 2, at 93-202. Few defenders of tax exemption go to this
length. The argument rests on the improbable first premise that bond buyers in general pay more for tax
exemption than its total (not merely marginal) value. Moreover, the statistics and calculations that lay
behind this $79,000,000 figure were subjected to sharp challenge by the Treasury's economists. The latter
disputed Professor Lutz's statistics purporting to show a .6% interest differential between first-grade
municipals and first-grade taxable bonds, and presented tabulations that indicated that the interest differential between such issues varied widely from time to time according to market judgment of the relative
security of such issues; indeed, at times in 1933, 1934, 1937, and 1938, the differential favored taxable
issues. Secondly, the Treasury economists pointed out that, even on the basis of a .6% differential,
Professor Lutz had undercalculated the tax loss to the taxing governments, and overcalulated the
interest saving to the issuing governments. Id. at 575-646.
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3.
At whatever point we place the marginal value of tax exemption-at zero or at
some higher figure-it must be granted that all inframarginal purchasers of tax
exemption realize a gain upon the purchase. For individuals, this profit is greater
or less according to whether the purchaser's income is large or small, because of the
progressive character of the federal personal income tax rate schedule. As stated
earlier, for an individual with $5,o0ooo of taxable income, the saving is equal to
four fifths of the current market yield on his capital minus any "tax exemption"
differential that may exist, while for individuals with $4,ooo of taxable income the
saving is equal to only one twenty-fifth of such return. In short, the profit of tax
exemption to the purchaser of government securities is progressive according to his
income bracket. And yet the cost, if any, of such tax exemption, in terms of interest
differential, is the same to all purchasers. With our present income tax system, the
sale of tax-exempt securities constitutes a bounty granted to rich individuals for
being rich.
The "progressive" nature of governmental security tax exemption serves t6
weaken the "progressive" character of the personal income tax rate schedule. The
heavier the tax rates in the higher income brackets, the greater the inducement to avoid
the ta by investing "nonoperating" capital in tax-exempts. Some writers have argued
that the presence of this avenue of escape "nullifies" progressive income taxation.
Such an argument rests on the assumption that rich men could be induced to invest
all of their capital in tax-exempt securities. This is a false assumption, as was pointed
out earlier in this article, since only "nonoperating" and "noncontrol" capital-usually
a small fraction of a rich man's wealth-is susceptible of transfer into tax-exempt
securities. But even though progressive personal income taxation is not "nullified"
by the existence of tax-exempt securities, it is rendered uneven, and therefore unjust,
in the distribution of its burdens.
4Finally, we may note the argument that it is the rich who, out of their "nonoperating" and "noncontrol" funds, should supply the "venturesome" capital for
new enterprises that entail risk but hold forth the greatest promise of economic
advance for the nation. This proposition is one of the many in the field of economics
that can only be asserted, without possibility of proof or disproof. If any weight is
given to it, we have still another case against exemption of governmental securities.
For, unquestionably, a strong inducement is offered to the rich to seek the security
of governmental issues, with their bounty of tax exemption, rather than the taxable
risk of new ventures. Because of the existence of tax-exempt securities, new ventures
to some extent must fail to obtain the financial support they deserve, or they must
gain such support from investors in lower income brackets, who should be the ones
to invest for security rather than risk.

